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Impasse and Opportunity: Reframing
Postcolonial Territory at the India-
Bangladesh Border
Jason Cons
1 On  18  December  2013,  the  Congress  Government  introduced  a  bill  in  the  Indian
Parliament to implement the 1974 Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) with Bangladesh.1 If
ratified, the Agreement would finally ‘resolve’ a border dispute that has long troubled
India-Bangladesh relations concerning the presence of Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and
Bangladeshi  enclaves  in  India.  Specifically,  the  LBA made  way  for  the  absorption  of
several hundred enclaves, chhitmahal in Bengali, into their bounding states.2 The bill was
the latest in a long series of proposals to bring the enclaves into line with conventional
understandings  of  territorial  contiguity,  sovereignty  and  national  space.  Like  its
predecessors, it faced long odds.
2 Enclave exchange has been a persistent  and proverbial  fly  in the ointment of  India-
Bangladesh border politics. This version of the bill proved no different. Members of the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) protested its introduction vociferously. Members of West
Bengal’s  Trinamool  Congress  and  the  Asom  Gana  Parishad  (Assam  People’s  Party)
attempted to physically arrest copies of the bill from India’s external affairs minister (
The Times of India 2013). Trinamool MP, Derek O’Brian tweeted his disgust over the bill,
writing, ‘A lame duck government introduced Bangladesh Giveaway Bill’ (DNA India 2013).
Meanwhile, Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal’s chief minister and head of the Trinamool
Congress party, posted on her Facebook page, ‘We are not accepting, not accepting and
not  accepting  [the  agreement].  The  state  government  will  not  implement  it’  (
BDnews24.com 2013).
3 That the LBA seemed destined for failure was no surprise to those who have followed the
enclaves’ postcolonial diplomatic history. Yet, it did assert a series of urgent questions
about the regional concept of South Asia and the territorial boundaries that constitute it.
Postcolonial territory in South Asia—by which I mean both nationalist and communal
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ideologies of blood and soil and the specific claims and technologies for controlling space
—presents a range of challenges and paradoxes to scholarly and popular imaginations of
the region.3 This essay engages one of these challenges—enclaves—in order to make a
series  of  claims  about  the  salience  of  borders  and  border  conflicts  to  postcolonial
territory. As I argue at length elsewhere (Cons n.d.),  these spaces are key sites in the
production of  postcolonial  territory.  They are ‘sensitive spaces’  that provoke anxious
regulations and debates. By calling these enclaves ‘sensitive’ spaces, I mean that they
trouble conceptualizations of state, nation, and citizen even as they are caught up in
nationalist debates over security, sovereignty, and identity. The chhitmahal emerge not
just as material sites, but also as issues within national politics that seem disproportionate
to their size, population, or geopolitical import. They are thus productive places to begin
disentangling the relationality between nationalist framings of territory and its quotidian
experiences. Moreover, they have critical relevance for understandings—both political
and scholarly—of South Asia. 
4 The notion of  South Asia as  a region is  predicated on a cartographic imagination of
discretely cordoned-off states. As Ludden argues, ‘Habits of mapping expunge dissonance
from our geographical  imagination by invisibly burying disorderly spaces under neat
graphics of national order’ (Ludden 2003: 1058). This Westphalian vision of orderly space
constitutes  a  powerful  mental  map,  one that  governs not  just  scholarly  inquiry,  but
political conceptualizations of space (Migdal 2010).4 Yet, within the region, not only has
this orderly spatial imagination been a historical fiction, the disjuncture between it and
ground realities has been a constant source of discord in nationalist politics and inter-
regional relations—discord which has produced regular violence at and within national
borders.5 These tensions suggest a need not just to better understand broad imaginations
of  territory  or  local  experiences  of  it.  They  also  suggest  a  need  to  attend  to  the
relationships between these broad and localized framings—their articulations and
disarticulations,  their  conjunctures  and  disjunctures.  To  do  so  implies  thinking
postcolonial territory as an analytic, rather than merely descriptive, category (Elden 2013,
Sassen 2013).
5 The enclaves embody a telling impasse that haunts postcolonial territory in South Asia—
namely, the inability to disentangle material needs and realities of people living on the
bleeding edge of state space from nationalist imaginations of blood and soil that are often
indexed to the unfinished processes of Partition (Zamindar 2007, Chatterji 1999). To move
beyond  this  impasse  requires  understanding  the  ways  in  which  places  such  as  the
chhitmahal are amplified into sensitive space and the ways that people living in such
spaces negotiate such amplifications. The enclaves demonstrate the limits to thinking of
territory as only a political technology of rule—a set of practices organized around the
ordering  and  management  of  space  (Elden 2013).  They  are  also  emblematic  of  what
Sanakran  Krishna  (1994)  calls  ‘cartographic  anxieties’—violent  mappings  of  national
anxieties of survival onto places like borderlands. At the same time, understanding these
zones  only  through the  lens  of  regulation  or  cartographic  anxiety  yields  a  vision  of
territory as effectively structured by national concerns. This belies lived realities in the
enclaves and in South Asian borderlands more broadly, which are anything but passive
reflections or  imprints  of  national  logics  (essays  in Gellner 2013).  Territory,  as  much
recent  work  has  shown,  emerges  and  is  produced  through  both  broad  political
maneuvering and more everyday forms of  territory making (Erazo 2013).  These local
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realities  have  a  different  story  to  tell  about  how territory  is  made and lived at  the
interstices of South Asia. 
6 What I intend in this essay is to make a modest epistemological intervention into the
discussion of borders, territory, and the concept of South Asia. Studies of borders often
either choose to engage the broad, macro historical processes of border and state making,
or the micropolitics of life in the shadow of state control. I propose that if we are to
reimagine territory and region, both perspectives are necessary. Thinking these positions
together  at  once  exposes  the  mystifications  of  territory  in  nationalist  debate  and
untangles the impasse of viewing space through a nationalist lens by bringing mobility,
spatial regulation, violence, and competing territorialities within a single analytic frame
(Sur 2014).6 My argument here is that to simply reject nationalist framings of space is to
misunderstand the very processes that make spaces like the enclaves such intractable
issues. Yet, to view the enclaves solely through such framings is to miss the idea that
people living in sensitive space engage territory in ways not explainable solely within
state or nationalist logics (Jones 2012b). What is important, then, is to understand the
relationality between these two registers of territory and, moreover, to be attentive to
this  relationality’s  fluctuating  dynamics.  Such  attention  destabilizes  uniform
conceptualizations of territory and region in favor of more fluid and negotiated visions.
Here, the region emerges as a tension between projects seeking to codify space along
nationalist and often communal lines and a set of lived relationships and mobilities with
contingent and unstable ties to such projects.
7 To  illustrate  this,  I  first  look  at  debates  over  enclave  exchange.  These  debates  are
characterized  by  persistent  breakdowns  of  attempts  to  forge  durable  solutions  to
questions of territory and citizenship for enclave residents.  Yet,  if  these negotiations
have failed to yield exchange, we should not be misled into thinking that they have not
been productive of territory.  Indeed,  national debates have produced the enclaves as
particular kinds of spaces. This nationalist view of space does not constitute the only
possibility for imaging borders and territory. A bottom up view produces a fundamentally
different picture. I accordingly contrast the geopolitical history of the chhitmahal with a
brief look at the lived experiences of one enclave, Dahagram, that has been at the heart of
debates about the LBA. Not surprisingly, such a view yields a markedly different picture
of life and space at the border.  Yet,  what I  am more interested in are the ways that
quotidian  negotiations  of  projects  of  rule—often  for  purposes  as  straightforward  as
economic gain—highlight new forms of territoriality at the border. What emerges is not a
rejection of official projects of control, but a transformation of them. This suggests the
need and possibility for re-constituting the region from the margins by taking a more
fluid and ethnographic vantage point (Van Schendel 2002a). 
 
Territory’s ‘odd-bits’
8 What did the LBA contain that made it so objectionable to parties as dissimilar as the BJP
and the Trinamool Congress? Why do these tiny blips of territory provoke such animated
responses?  One way to answer these questions would be to take the rhetoric  of  the
current  debate  over  the  LBA  seriously.  A  point  that  regularly  emerges  here  is  the
disparity in the amount of land to be exchanged.7 The configuration of the enclaves to be
swapped is such that there would be a net loss to India of approximately 10,000 acres,
roughly .001 % of the country’s total territory. Yet, as Das and Raju (2012) point out, this
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10,000 acres is land that Indian officials can neither access nor administer, as it falls on
the wrong side of the international border with Bangladesh. It is only nominally part of
India. Moreover, the land differential is so comparatively small that this concern might
justifiably  be  read  as  a  petty  calculus  of  exchange.8 A  more  salient  point  raised  in
contemporary  debates  is  the  articulation  of  national  policies  towards  the  India-
Bangladesh border and the complex border politics within states along it. Controversies
over the LBA within these states are indexed to long histories and concerns over cross-
border migration, regional violence, and local autonomy in India’s Northeast (Sur 2012,
Chatterji 2007, McDuie-Ra 2012). Such concerns are clearly urgent and crucial in parsing
the  contemporary  debate  over  the  LBA.  Yet,  to  see  the  conflict  as  a  clash  between
national and regional politics, or as a squabble over small amounts of land, obscures the
problematic place of the enclaves within counterpoised Indian and Bangladeshi national
imaginations. 
9 Rather, to understand the concern over such spaces, we must locate them within broader
histories of territory and region. The chhitmahal were originally discontinuous territorial
holdings of Zamindars and chieftains in the Mughal army’s Northern incursion into the
kingdom of Koch Behar (Van Schendel 2002b). At Partition, a number of chhitmahal found
themselves  on either  side  of  a  new border.  As  tensions  between India  and Pakistan
escalated in the 1950s, there were increasing numbers of incidents related to these spaces
(Whyte 2002). Yet, these conflicts remained largely matters of local negotiation between
populations (both inside and outside of the enclaves) and government officials struggling
with the complexities of the new Partition boundary. With the emergence of national
debates over exchange, however, the enclaves began their transformation from one of a
series of spatial problems into sensitive spaces—impossibly marginalized, yet increasingly
central to national imaginations of territory. 
10 The  first  attempt  to  address  these  troublesome  spaces  through  exchange,  thus
normalizing  the  territorial  complexities  of  the  Bengal  border,  was  the  Nehru-Noon
Accords. They reflected a decidedly optimistic technocratic perspective on territory—one
that imagined that border issues could be resolved with a stroke of a pen. On 4 June 1958,
in a  somewhat  cavalier  statement  made in his  monthly press  conference,  Jawaharlal
Nehru  claimed  that  the  ongoing  border  disputes  between  India  and  Pakistan  were
relatively minor and that ‘any two reasonable people on behalf of the two Governments
could sit  together  and decide  them in a  day or  two’.9 This  ‘responsible’  counterpart
presented himself in Feroz Khan Noon, who assumed the Prime Ministership of Pakistan
in December 1957. In early September, the two heads of state met in Delhi to hammer out
the contours of just such an agreement.
11 In a triumphant 1958 Statement to the Lok Sabha outlining the results of the Accords,
Nehru  offered  an  account  of  the  enclaves  as  minor  abnormalities  easily  addressed
through rational intervention:
The Cooch-Behar State had little bits of territory all over, and some of those fell in
Pakistan and some in India on partition. […] Therefore, the result is that we have
some territory in Pakistan, little enclaves, little islands, and they have some here,
which is very awkward. […] They are just odd bits, usually the home of smugglers
and other fugitives from the law. So, it has been decided ultimately that we should
just exchange them. 
12 Nehru’s remarks reduced the enclaves to administrative hassles—odd ‘bits’ that could be
managed  through  rational  intervention.  The  enclaves  are  presented  as  territorial
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accidents—the result of Radcliffe’s careless division of Bengal. The Accords would bring
these problematic spaces in line with the map, with territorial norms, and, consequently,
with  the  forces  of  law and  order  (Neocleous 2003).  However,  Nehru  radically
underestimated the enclaves’ emerging resonance in nationalist discourse. 
13 Almost immediately following the September 10th announcement of the Accords,  both
Nehru and Noon were attacked by conservative oppositional parties within their own
countries for having betrayed national interests and national sovereignty. In Pakistan,
Fazlur Rahman, a Muslim League representative in Parliament, mounted an attack on
Noon for what he claimed was a blatant attempt to ‘to hoodwink and mislead the people
to hide the fact of the shameless surrender of Pakistan’s vital interests at the alter of
Bharati  appeasement’  (Dawn 1958).  Meanwhile,  in  India,  Nehru  was  attacked  by  Jana
Sangh MP and future BJP Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee,  who claimed that the
Accords  were  not  only  illegal,  but  a  betrayal  of  national  interest  and  the  rights  of
citizenship of Indian enclave residents. As Vajpayee argued, ‘Nobody, not even the Prime
Minister, has the right to deprive any Indian citizen of his nationality and citizenship’. By
tying  the  question  of  territory  together  with  citizenship,  Vajpayee  reframed  the
chhitmahal not just as zones filled with criminals and smugglers, but also as spaces within
which Indian [Hindu] citizens clung to tenuous national territory. In short, the enclaves
became  territorial  symbols—spaces  encapsulating  the  antinomies  of  post-Partition
belonging.
14 The Accords proved a political stumbling block for Nehru’s Congress Party. In the face of
increasing opposition, Nehru was forced to qualify his earlier enthusiasm in a statement
to the Lok Sabha in 1960: 
At the time I was clear in my mind that the whole agreement, in spite of certain
aspects of it which were not agreeable to us, was profitable and advantageous. […]
But there is a ‘but’. I did not realise then that there is a certain human aspect of it.
[…] And subsequently when this aspect has come before me, I have felt troubled in
my mind. 
15 Nehru’s  suddenly  ‘troubled  mind’  underscored  how  deeply  affective  questions  of
territorial integrity can be in nationalist discourse (Billé 2013).10 It highlighted the stakes
of  not  treating the  enclaves  ‘sensitively’.  In  this  regard,  Nehru’s  reversal  captures  a
central trope in the chhitmahal’s postcolonial history—their seeming stubborn refusal to




16  Following the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971,  Indira  Gandhi  and Sheik Mujibur
Rahman attempted to capitalize on the goodwill between India and newly independent
Bangladesh to resolve outstanding border issues between the two states. The results were
the  1974  LBA,  also  known as  the  Indira-Mujib  Accords,  which proposed  a  wholesale
exchange of the enclaves on either side of the border with one exception. Bangladesh was
to relinquish its claim on a disputed border area known as Berubari. In exchange, India
would  lease,  into  perpetuity,  a  170-meter  long  land  bridge  known as  the  Tin  Bigha
Corridor  connecting  Dahagram-Angarpota  (henceforth  Dahagram)—the  largest
Bangladeshi  enclave  situated  in  India—to  ‘mainland’  Bangladesh.11 Once  again,  the
Agreement prompted heated debate on both sides of the border over the legality and
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ethics  of  handing  over  territory  to  another  sovereign  state.  Bangladesh  soon  ceded
Berubari. However, the struggle to open the Tin Bigha Corridor was to become a morass
of nationalist and increasingly communal politics.
17 In  1981,  as  a  step  towards  resolving  the  question  of  Dahagram  and  pushing  for
implementation of the 1974 Treaty, the Government of Bangladesh attempted to conduct
a census of the enclave. Terms of passage through Indian territory were negotiated for
census workers, but following the implementation of the census, local activists in India
organized a blockade of the enclave, cutting it off from access to both Indian markets in
Mekhliganj  and Bangladeshi  markets  in  Patgram (for  discussion,  see  Cons 2012).  The
Bangladesh  Observer reported that  supplies  of  food and medicine in the enclave were
scarce and that several  residents had died from starvation and lack of  medical  care.
‘Equipped with guns, arrows, lathis and hand bombs, the Indian nationals are patrolling
around  these  enclaves,  preventing  helpless  Bangladeshi  nationals  of  Dahagram  and
Angarpota  to  come  out  and  enter  Bangladesh  main  soil  to  purchase  essential
commodities’(Bhasin 1996: 808). The expression of outrage in the piece captured not just
an offence committed against a marginal population at the border, but an offence against
‘nationals’—beleaguered  citizens  who lived  at  the  mercy  of  a  territorially  aggressive
Indian state and population. It further flagged the question of enclave exchange as both
symbolic and symptomatic of India’s willingness to discount Bangladeshi lives and the
rights of the Government of Bangladesh to protect them. As the Bangladesh Times wrote,
‘an inherent and a legally vested right of a population and its natural custodian, the State
of Bangladesh, is going ignored’ (Bhasin 1996: 808).
18 The media coverage of the blockade in Bangladesh raised concerns in the Lok Sabha about
its overall impact on India-Bangladesh relations. In a heated debate, Amar Roy Pradhan,
an  MP  from  West  Bengal,  dismissed  concerns  over  the  census,  suggesting  that  the
suffering of residents of Dahagram was inconsequential compared to the suffering of over
100,000 Indian citizens living in Indian enclaves inside of Bangladesh. In Pradhan’s words,
‘in  Bangladesh,  they  are  living  under  sub-human  conditions—no  administration,  no
police, no chowkidar, no panchayats, no voting, nothing of the sort. It is a matter of grave
regret’  (Bhasin 1996: 804).  Pradhan’s  observation  reflects  not  an  empirical  or
demographic  reality  of  life  in  Indian enclaves,  but  rather,  a  political  imagination of
territory, community, and suffering (Moore 2005). This and ensuing debates indexed the
enclaves to broader concerns in the relationship between India and Bangladesh. These
included the rights of citizens (of both states) at the border, the sovereign control of
space,  and  the  sanctioned  violence  (real  and  imagined)  against  those  living  on  this
contested edge of territory. 
19 If the enclaves became a zone in which nationalist and often-communal politics were
regularly  grafted  onto  space,  they  also  are  sites  in  which  moments  of  cross-border
cooperation do, occasionally, produce change. Despite vociferous debate, the Tin Bigha
Corridor finally opened on 26 June 1992 in a moment of diplomatic thaw following the
removal of General Mohammed Ershad from power in Bangladesh (Cons 2012). The return
of  democracy  to  Bangladesh eased the  politics  of  opening the  Corridor,  but  not  the
nationalist rhetoric around it. It opened amidst the arrests of numerous local activists
and threats by the BJP to train a ‘suicide squad’ to prevent its opening (Chaudhuri 1992).
Initially,  the  Corridor  was  open for  only  one  hour  a  day.  This  amount  of  time  was
gradually increased until,  in 2002,  it  was opened for 12 hours a day,  during daylight
hours.  If  the  LBA’s  partial  fulfillment  addressed  some  of  the  spatial  challenges  of
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Dahagram, however, it also further transformed it into a stage upon which territorial
dramas were enacted (see below). Moreover, the Corridor transformed Dahagram into the
most closely monitored chhitmahal along the border, surrounded by BSF watchtowers and
regularly patrolled by armed paramilitary border guards from each country.
20 This episodic history signals  the patterns that have shaped the debates over enclave
exchange—patterns that have reappeared in the current round of negotiations regarding
the  LBA.  It  also  points  to  ways  in  which  territorial  imaginations  and  cartographic
anxieties become inextricably linked to territorial practicalities and attempts to resolve
and rationalize space.  Following Mitchell  (2002),  one might argue that  territory here
emerges as the mutual constitution of affective representation and reality—a particularly
problematic  and emotive enframing of  space.  Seen as such,  the enclaves represent a
territorial impasse—the inability to disentangle concrete space from the imagination of it
as simultaneously threatening and under threat. Such an impasse does not, as we have seen,
preclude  meaningful  transformation  in  border-politics.  Indeed,  attempts  by  political
leaders to think past this impasse have lead to concrete changes in life at the border. But
it does systematically efface other possible imaginations of territory and region. How
might we think beyond this impasse? My suggestion here is that we begin by considering
the spatial imaginations and negotiations of those who live in the enclaves themselves.
 
Quotidian forms of territory
21 If part of the project of rethinking South Asia is imagining possibilities as well as
limitations, it is important to also examine the ways that territory might be rethought
from a more grounded perspective. The articulation between the enclaves as imagined
and concrete spaces has crucial implications for the lives of those living there. Indeed, the
outcomes of  the broad debate over Dahagram and the Tin Bigha Corridor have been
central features of life in the enclave. Yet, at the same time, life in Dahagram is shaped by
more than these framings alone. It is a fluid negotiation of a range of processes that
converge  in  sensitive  space.  To  conclude,  let  me  then  focus  on  a  set  of  recent
transformations in Dahagram’s political economy in order to highlight the ways in which
broad imaginations and negotiations over territory refract in particular spaces.12
22 In 2007, when I began conducting research in the enclaves, Dahagram was a palpably
uncomfortable place. Tensions over the Corridor were high and disagreements between
India and Bangladesh (and between Congress and the Bangladesh National Party) were
escalating—particularly  in  conjunction  with  the  building  of  the  border  fence  with
Bangladesh and with the regular shooting of Bangladeshis by BSF troops at the border
(see  Jones 2012a,  Human Rights  Watch 2010,  Sur 2014).  Meanwhile,  numerous
development initiatives were at work within the enclave. These had produced, among
other  things,  paved  roads  that  saw  little  or  no  use  by  motorized  vehicles,  a  fully
constructed functioning hospital that had never opened for business, and a model village
project devoid of denizens. All of these projects seemingly demarcated and laid claim to
the  enclave  as  Bangladeshi  territory,  but  had  little  impact  on  the  well-being  of  the
enclave’s residents. Local transportation was limited to rickshaws and cycle-vans. To get
to Dahagram, it took at minimum an hour ride from Patgram, the nearest market town in
Bangladesh,  approximately  11 km  away.  People  were  anxious  about  the  future  and,
especially, about the Corridor, often suggesting that the BSF could close the Corridor for
good on a whim. Such fears were supported by the BSF’s occasional implementation of
Impasse and Opportunity: Reframing Postcolonial Territory at the India-Bangla...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 10 | 2014
7
new restrictions on what could be brought through the Corridor, especially the number
of cows that could be transported to market.13 Agriculture within the enclave was robust,
with regular trade with Patgram, but there was little other industry or open commerce
besides  a  few  tea  stalls  and  tailoring  shops.  In  short,  life  in  Dahagram  seemed
oppressively  marked  by  broader  tensions  over  the  border  and  their  corresponding
politics and anxieties. 
23 In 2013, I returned to Dahagram after several years, to discover a remarkably different set
of circumstances. In my absence, the enclave had transformed into a frontier boom-town.
Now, instead of rickshaws, I traveled to Dahagram via a regular tempo van. The two hubs
of activity in the enclave—Guchogram near the Tin Bigha Corridor and Bongerbari, the
administrative and political center of the enclave—were bustling and crowded not just
with people but also hulking and brightly colored transportation trucks. There was a
steady stream of traffic moving through the Corridor. Moreover, the atmosphere seemed
to have shifted from one of anxiety to one of comparatively prosperous optimism. 
24 The apparent reason for this transformation was the opening of the Tin Bigha Corridor
for  24 hours  a  day  on  19 October 2011.  This  opening,  thus  far,  represented  the  only
tangible outcome of the new debates over the LBA. The opening marked a significant
moment  in the history of  the enclave.  Now,  while  the Corridor  remained under  the
administration and control of the BSF, enclave residents could come and go, day or night.
Signaling the national significance of both the Corridor and of Dahagram, the opening
was presided over by Prime Minister Sheik Hasina, the first visit by a head of state to
Dahagram since before the opening of the Corridor in 1992. Hasina’s visit to the enclave
was  recalled  with  pride  by  almost  everyone  I  spoke  to.  A  new  brick  and  concrete
memorial to her had been raised in the center of the enclave. During her visit, Hasina also
granted a series of longstanding demands of enclave residents, noting, according to my
informants,  that  ‘these  people  have  suffered  enough.  Give  them what  they  ask  for.’
Enclave residents regularly expressed the feeling that they were now, truly, citizens of
Bangladesh. As a smallholder farmer I spoke with had it, ‘the opening of the Corridor for
24 hours has put us in a better frame of mind. Things are good here now.’ On the surface,
it appeared as though geopolitical negotiations over space at the border had, indeed,
yielded positive transformations in the lives of border residents. 
25 Yet,  even a  cursory glance  at  what  was  happening in the  enclave  revealed that  the
Corridor’s opening was not the only, or perhaps even the most significant, change in
Dahagram’s landscape. What appeared to be the more immediate source of the enclave’s
shift in fortunes was the massive adoption of a relatively new cash crop: corn. Every
available plot of land seemed covered in corn husks and stalks from the recent harvest. A
number of new godowns had been built since my last visit, all now bursting at the seams.
The large trucks in the enclave were being stacked high with sacks of corn as well. Corn
kernels were drying on many of Dahagram’s paved roads, transforming the color of the
tracks from a dull asphalt grey to a bright golden yellow. 
26 The demand for corn was being driven by Bangladesh’s thriving poultry and shrimp
aquaculture industry.14 It  had clearly emerged as a major boom crop in the Patgram
region  as  a  whole,  not  just  in  Dahagram.  ‘People  are  growing  corn  even  in  their
courtyards,’  a  man  in  Patgram  told  me.  Yet,  its  transformation  of  the  enclave  was
especially stark. Its introduction, at scale, into the region began in 2007, when a company
called Doyel, with funding and support from crop and soil scientists at Cornell University
and CIMMYT, the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, had introduced
Impasse and Opportunity: Reframing Postcolonial Territory at the India-Bangla...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 10 | 2014
8
the crop into Patgram (CIMMYT E-News 2009). They had done this by partnering with a
national  bank  which  offered  a  microcredit  scheme  whereby  Doyel  would  hold  the
provisional  land  titles  of  farmers  in  Dahagram  and  guarantee  loans  for  farmers  to
purchase seed stock. The scheme was launched in Dahagram in early 2007 at a ceremony
that I  attended,  a ceremony that was,  itself,  framed as an intervention that honored
Dahagram residents’ long-history of suffering. As the NCC official who visited the enclave
to launch the scheme made clear, the loans-for-corn-seed program was not framed as a
strategy to expand agricultural markets, but rather as a gesture to honor the struggle for
the enclave and to help its downtrodden and marginalized residents.15
27 Doyel ultimately went out of business,  and many in the enclave complained that the
company never returned their land titles. Others complained that recalcitrant farmers in
the enclave had forced Doyel out of business by failing to repay their loans. Whatever the
reason for the company’s failure, the gap opened by Doyel was a business opportunity for
local groups within the enclave seeking to establish new modes of territorial control.
After the enclave opened in 1992, as I describe elsewhere (Cons 2013), a flood of new
migrants  moved  in  and  purchased  land  from Hindu  residents,  many  of  whom were
abandoning the enclave, at fire sale prices. These new migrants were known locally as
Bhatiyas (outsiders),  and though they remained politically marginal within Dahagram,
they  quickly  emerged  as  central  economic  players,  expanding  existing  holdings  and
experimenting  with  new  strategies  for  capital  accumulation.  Indeed,  though  Doyel’s
initial expansion into Dahagram was framed as a celebration of the enclave’s history it
was primarily Bhatiya farmers who began adopting the new crop. 
28 Beginning in  2011,  around the  time that  Doyel  was  collapsing and the Corridor  was
opened for a full 24 hours, several of these farmers banded together to capitalize on the
possibilities  of  corn.  This  new  syndicate  began  providing  seed  and  fertilizer  at
preferential  prices to farmers in Dahagram in exchange for purchasing rights to the
harvested crop.  This allowed them to develop a monopoly on corn exports from the
enclave. Such arrangements are not uncommon in Bangladesh and are part and parcel of
how many  mohajan [moneylending]  and  syndicate  operations  work.  Indeed,  this  one
seemed particularly successful. One of the heads of the syndicate—a Bhatiya farmer who
had risen from modest means to become one of the wealthiest denizens of the enclave—
told me that 95 % of all cultivatable land within the enclave was now being used for corn
production. People seemed to be making money hand over fist. 
29 Derek Hall (2011) argues that crop booms, such as the explosion of corn production in
Dahagram, provide crucial clues to the ways that smallholders reconfigure land-rights
and uses by bringing a range of different forms of power to bear on the control of land.
Yet, the emergence of corn in Dahagram also spoke to the ways that broader political
debates over territory transformed a range of productive possibilities in sensitive space.
Members of the syndicate that I spoke to openly acknowledged that seed money from the
venture came from the smuggling of household goods from India into the enclave for sale.
Yet, other smallholder farmers in the enclave who were the syndicate’s clients told a
different origination story of the corn boom—that of cattle smuggling. Cattle smuggling
has long been a central trope in debates over the India-Bangladesh border. The export
has proved a profitable trade for both those involved in smuggling itself  and border
security forces who often become its de facto regulators. 16 The trade is inflected by a
communal rhetoric—the transportation of sacred cows over the border for slaughter in
Muslim meat markets. 
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30 When I began research in the enclave in 2007, a crackdown on smuggling through the
enclave had emerged as the central political concern of both the BSF and of parties within
Dahagram. Specifically,  the BSF had placed a cattle ceiling on the movement of cows
through the Corridor, limiting the number of cattle that could be taken to market to six
on any given haat (market) day. The ceiling had been not only a source of tension, but also
a mechanism for re-arranging political power within the enclave. The Union Parishad
Chairman at the time, who many suggested was deeply implicated in cattle smuggling
himself, was given the power to decide who within Dahagram would be allowed to take
cattle to market. The Chairman immediately began using this as a tool to consolidate his
own political power. 
31 In 2013, the ceiling still remained in place, but its enforcement had become markedly lax.
Yet, with the opening of the Corridor for 24 hours a day in 2011, and with the general ease
in tension along the border that  marked the joint  tenure of  the nominally  amicable
Congress  Party  and the  Awami  League,  cattle  smuggling  had re-emerged as  a  major
source of capital within the enclave. Not only had schemes for smuggling cattle through
the Corridor re-surfaced, but a longstanding relationship with cattle smuggling rings in
surrounding Indian areas had been revitalized with a mandated relaxation in border
patrols in the area. Numerous farmers who I spoke with pointed to this reemergence in
the  cattle  trade  as  the  source  of  capital  for  launching  the  corn  syndicate  and
transforming the enclave’s agricultural landscape.
32 The political economic transformations related to Dahagram’s corn boom were thus as
intimately tied to shifts in the political imagination of the border as they were to concrete
transformations in border policy and broader frameworks of capital accumulation within
Bangladesh. The contingent convergence of a crop boom with a moment of comparative
cross-border cooperation—a moment which also facilitated the opening of the Corridor
for 24 hours a day—had produced a significant shift in the fortunes of Dahagram farmers.
Such shifts, I would argue, suggest not a withering away or resolution of sensitive space.
Rather,  they  indicate  shifts  in  the  relationality  between broad  nationalist  and  more
localized registers and framings of territory. Creative individuals in such spaces make use
of such shifts for material advantage, control of terrain, and remaking territory in ways
that best suit their own ends. Yet, this relationality itself is highly unstable and subject to
constant transformation. Indeed, the linkages between border politics, cattle, and corn
suggest that Dahagram’s corn boom may be a particularly ephemeral transformation—
one subject not just to market fluctuations, but also to the return to power of political
parties, in either state, less disposed to cross-border cooperation.17
33 Importantly, neither the focus on nationalist representation nor lived realities alone can
explain these recent transformations in Dahagram. On the one hand, viewed from the
nationalist vantage point, Dahagram appears as a sensitive space—one that embodies the
tension  between  administration  of  a  challenging  border  and  a  range  of  nationalist
anxieties over territory, identity, and the unfinished business of Partition. Understanding
such a perspective helps in untangling the complexities of space in Dahagram—tensions
over the movement of people and goods through the Corridor, the stakes and symbolics
in the opening of the Corridor for 24 hours a day, and more. Yet, viewed from inside of
the enclave, Dahagram appears as more of a vector for broader sets of territorial issues—
the  political  economy of  Bangladesh,  fluctuations  in  outlook towards  smuggling,  the
politics of land use. Looking from these vantage points simultaneously opens up ways to
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34 This essay makes an epistemological contribution to the re-imagination of postcolonial
territory, a re-imagination that has implications for both analytic and political figurings
of South Asia. A longstanding contention of border studies has been that the margins are
productive  locations  from  which  to  think  nation,  state,  and  territory  (see  Cons &
Sanyal 2013). This is so not just because margins are privileged locations for engaging the
contradictions of state-making, but also because margins are often intimately bound up
in conceptualizations and imaginations of nation and state.18 That said, many studies that
engage  this  challenge  take  a  bifurcated  approach,  focusing  either  on  the  ways  that
nations frame their borders, or on how local territorialities constitute alternative spatial
modes.  Paradoxically,  in  both  narratives,  state  control  of  space  continues  to  be  the
central dynamic and focus of analysis. My claim here is that to understand the vagaries of
territory in postcolonial  South Asia,  we must incorporate both of  these into a single
analytic frame in ways that are attendant to the securitization of space, but not over-
determined by them. What we should attend to is the relationship between these two
registers, the extent to which articulations do and do not emerge between them, and the
ways that such articulations open up new possibilities—political, economic, and otherwise
—for people who navigate borders on a daily basis. Such a project is not unique (see, for
example,  Jones 2012b, McDuie-Ra 2012).  Yet,  its implications continue to be critical  in
moving beyond monolithic and polarized views of territory and of South Asia as a region. 
35  Analytically, an examination of the histories of sensitive space illustrates the way that
territory emerges out of a confluence of deeply affective anxieties about the ‘nation,’ and
its ‘citizens.’ Spaces such as the enclaves are over-represented in national imaginations of
territory  precisely  because  they  unsettle  territorialized  national  imaginations
(Billé 2013).  They  are  spaces  that,  to  paraphrase  Schmitt  (1985)  (paraphrasing
Kierkegaard)  the  center  thinks  with  intense  passion.  These  spatial  imaginations
collectively produce what I call here a territorial impasse—the inability to disentangle
spatial imaginaries from spatial practicalities. These cartographic anxieties are manifest
not just in Parliamentary debate, but in the very landscape of spaces such as Dahagram.
The maintenance of boundaries—dramatized in the politics of the Tin Bigha Corridor—is
central  to producing national  territory and to shaping the lives of  those who live in
borderlands.  Yet,  life  in  the  borderland  is  more  than  simply  a  product  of  national
anxieties. It is better described as an engagement with the terrain that emerges from
overlaps between nationalist and other processes that shape territory—for example, the
strategic  exploitation of  crop booms and cattle  smuggling.  The relationship between
these  two  perspectives  yields  a  shifting  and  unstable  picture—one  of  both  radical
disconnects, such as hospitals that serve no one, and moments of convergence, such as
Dahagram’s  current  corn  boom.  This  picture  has  critical  implications  for  our
understanding of  the production of  territory.  On the one hand,  it  troubles  coherent
narratives about the framing and control of space. On the other, it helps reframe territory
as an active dialogue and set of negotiations over the meanings and uses of  land,  of
borders, and of projects that seek to establish often contradictory forms of rule. 
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36 Mrinalini Sinha, in a defense of regionalism, suggests, that ‘by the sheer ambiguity and
elusiveness  of  its  definition,  [the  regional]  provides  an  opportunity  to  reflect  more
pointedly on the fact that all spatial boundaries are inherently political and contingent’
(Sinha 2013: 266).  As  I  have  argued  in  this  essay,  a  possible  starting  point  for
reconstituting the regional notion of South Asia—to take, as Sinha urges, an ‘angular’
relationship to the nation—is to rethink territory from the perspective of both margins
and centers. If an understanding of broad projects of territory-making yields a view of the
ways territory is ossified in nationalist debate, a perspective from within sensitive space
yields  different  possible  understandings.  Cartographic  anxieties  blend  with  and  are
transformed by geopolitical currents, political economic trends, and the quotidian ways
that people in borderlands carve out livings against a landscape of political flux. South
Asia emerges as a striated space—overlapped and crisscrossed by people who struggle to
work  around  and  past  incomplete  projects  of  spatial  governance  and  intermittently
ossified borders.19 If my call to rethink the region this way is not unique, it is no less
urgent against South Asia’s contemporary landscape—a landscape in which, as debates
over  the  LBA  suggest,  territory  remains  a  fraught  battleground  in  which  affective
nationalist imaginations of space efface the lived realities of places such as Dahagram. 
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NOTES
1. Thanks to Aminah Mohammad-Arif for inviting me to participate in this special issue and to
Townsend Middleton and to  three  extremely  thought  provoking reviewers  for  comments  on
earlier versions of this paper. Funding for this project was generously provided by the Social
Science Research Council’s IDRF fellowship.
2. These enclaves are recognized by each state and regularly appear on maps of  the region,
however, they are inaccessible and unadministered by their ‘home’ state because they fall on the
wrong side of an international boundary. The bill also makes provisions for the resolution of
disputes over a series of spaces held in ‘adverse possession’ by both states, and several kilometers
of undemarcated border.
3. The literature on this subject is vast. Texts addressing these issues specifically related to the
India-Bangladesh border include Van Schendel (2002b, 2005), Hussain (2013), Jones (2009, 2012),
Sur (2013), McDuie-Ra (2012), Roy (2012), Feldman (2003), and Chatterji (1999, 2007).
4. There is  a  robust  debate in political  geography on moving beyond the vision of  states  as
naturalized containers of society. For a useful review of its various manifestations, see Brenner
(1999).
5. Examples of dissonance between geographic imaginations and lived realities abound in South
Asia, including the massive displacements of Partition (Zamindar 2007), disputes over territorial
possession (Ibrahim 2009,  Robinson 2013),  struggles  for  regional  autonomy and independence
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(Raghavan 2013,  Middleton n.d.),  questions  about  shared  resources  (Swain 1996),  and  the
identities and locations of increasingly mobile populations (Samaddar 1999, Sur 2013).
6. I echo here classic claims of postcolonial scholarship that seek to bring the metropole and the
colony into a single analytic frame (Stoler & Cooper 1997).
7. See, for example, Garg (2013).
8. Though it assumes more significance when viewed against the backdrop of, for example, the
BJP’s  recent  call  for  Bangladesh  to  give  land  to  India  in  compensation  for  the  migration  of
Bangladeshis  into  Assam  (BDnews24.com 2014).  Here,  fragmented  territories  are  intimately
indexed to broader meanings of population, demography, and possession, highlighting the ways
that even tiny amounts of land are over-determined within nationalist logics of space.
9. Nehru’s optimism seems, retrospectively, fantastic in the context of the range of seemingly
intractable problems presented by the border in the post-Partition period. For an exploration of
these, see Van Schendel (2005).
10. Billé goes so far as to suggest that lost territory is best understood as a ‘phantom limb’ in the
national psyche.
11. Dahagram is approximately 4,600 acres in size.
12. I make no claim here that Dahagram is representative of all enclaves. Indeed, for reasons
outlined above, it is quite distinct. For an exploration of the conditions of other chhitmahal, see
Jones (2009) and Shewly (2013).
13. For a full discussion of all of these issues, see Cons (n.d).
14. Themselves  industries  deeply  implicated  in  the  contemporary  production  of  territory  in
Bangladesh (see Paprocki & Cons 2014). 
15. A gesture, of course, with anticipated material benefits for all.
16. For more on the commodity flows—licit and illicit—across this border, see Sur (2013).
17. What the fate of Dahagram and the LBA will be under the new Modi administration is, as yet,
unclear. However, the BJP has voiced opposition to any attempts to ‘hurriedly’ resolve border
disputes through the LBA (Zaman 2014). Moreover, in the past, the BJP has regularly used the
question  of  cross-border  migration  as  an  issue  to  consolidate  political  power
(Ramachandran 1999).
18. See Tsing (1993) and essays in Das & Poole (2004).
19. See Ludden (2003), Sur (2013), Samaddar (1999). 
ABSTRACTS
This essay makes a case for reconceptualizing South Asia by refiguring postcolonial territory. It
does this by bringing together the broad political history of a series of enclaves along the India-
Bangladesh border with an ethnographic discussion of the contemporary political economy of
Dahagram,  the  largest  of  these  enclaves.  The  essay  argues  for  a  need  to  bring  nationalist
framings of space and more textured explorations of everyday forms of territory-making into a
single analytic frame. Doing so provides a way to understand and think beyond the territorial
impasses posed by nationalist framings of space—the inability to disentangle lived realities from
affectively charged conceptualizations of the nation and its borders. The essay, instead, reframes
territory as the relationality between broad spatial imaginaries and lived realities at the margins.
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Such a view allows for a conceptualization of the region that builds upwards from quotidian
negotiations to challenge nationalist and communal geographies.
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